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This paper builds an RBC model with an endogenous mechanism for firm defaults and
credit spreads. The model assumes a productive sector made of a class of intermediate
producers and a class of final producers. The intermediate producers borrow to fund
their operations and can default when large enough negative shocks affect their revenues.
The intermediate/final production structure implies that during periods of low economic
activity, the demand for the intermediate good is lower. This depresses the price of the
intermediate good and in turn depresses the revenues of the borrowing firms. Hence, higher
default rates during the lows of the business cycle. Inversely, default rates are lower when
the economy is improving: default rates are countercyclical. Intermediate producers are
financed by banks that take future defaults into account when setting lending rates. This
guarantees that credit spreads are countercyclical too.
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I present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a sector of firms that
borrow to finance the production of a single intermediate good, banks providing the
required financing and an endogenous mechanism for the borrowing firms to bankrupt
on their debt obligations. The intermediate good is used as an input by a represen-
tative firm that hires labour and rents capital to produce a final good that can be
consumed by households. Within the studied framework, intermediate production
firms raise financing using the information available to them at the financing stage,
including their assessment of their own production efficiency and expected sale prices
for the produced intermediate good. When a borrowing firm realises its actual pro-
duction efficiency and the prevailing sale prices, its assessment of its revenue might
drop to levels below what was initially expected. If this drop is large enough, the
firm’s revenues may not be enough to repay the debt obligations the firm committed
to at the financing stage, the firm would then fail to honour its financial obligations.
As a result, the lending bank takes over the firm and a fraction of production is
lost to reflect the costs of the bankruptcy workouts and the fact that banks are less
knowledgeable about the production process.
Intermediate production firms sell the good they produce to a set of final good
producing firms using a Cobb-Douglas type technology with labour, capital and the
intermediate good as inputs. The productivity of the intermediate production firms
is decomposed into an idiosyncratic part that is specific to the firm and a common
part that is shared with the productivity of the final good producing firms. This
guarantees two desirable outcomes of the model. First, bankruptcy is limited to
a subset of the intermediate production firms, namely the subset with low enough
idiosyncratic productivity. In addition, the importance of the systemic part of the
intermediate producers’ efficiencies helps control the contribution of the fluctuation
of intermediate production to total the variance of other aggregate variables.
I also assume that intermediate production firms are subject to a quadratic cost
of changing the production level. This limits the changes in loans’ demand by the
intermediate production firms following fluctuations in total factor productivity. The
inability of the borrowing firm to change its production levels without incurring
a cost maintains borrowing at relatively high levels during economic slumps thus
pushing default rates higher in periods of recession. This causes wider credit spreads
during periods of recession as banks need to hike loan rates further to reflect higher
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probabilities of default because firms borrow more than what they would have done
if changing their production level was frictionless. Similarly, this friction causes lower
default rates and tighter spreads when the economy is performing well. The costly
change of the borrowing firm production level helps reproduce quantitatively realistic
dynamics of default rates and credit spreads.
Banks are assumed to be competitive and face no entry costs. This implies that, in
expectation, banks make no profit and no loss from extending loans. To compensate
for the future default of a fraction of the intermediate production firms, banks charge
a credit spread on the top of the interest rate they expect to pay depositors. When
macroeconomic conditions worsen, both the sale price of the intermediate good and
the efficiency of the intermediate production are lower. This depresses the revenues of
the borrowing firms and, as a result, causes the proportion of firms expected to default
to increases. Banks take this into account and raise the interest rates of loans. This
in turn depresses the cycle further in an effect reminiscent of the financial accelerator
effect studied by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998)
and other authors. The difference between the two mechanisms being that within the
framework studied in this paper, banks readjust the interest rate they charge firms to
reflect the relationship between business cycles and bankruptcy rates as while typical
financial accelerator models assume rationing of credit following a worsening in the
market value of assets used as collateral by borrowers.
The division of the productive sector into one group of firms that borrows to
produce an intermediate good and a final representative firm that uses this good
to produce a final consumption good is crucial to the functioning of the model’s
main mechanism. Because the output of the intermediate producers is an input in
the final production process, the price of the intermediate good displays a procyclical
behaviour. When aggregate productivity, defined as the productivity of the final good
producer, is high, demand for the intermediate good increases and so does its price.
This improves the revenues of the borrowing firms and, in turn, decreases default
rates. Similarly, revenues are depressed when aggregate productivity is deteriorating
so that default rates are higher and credit spreads are wider. Countercyclical default
rates and credit spreads are thus generated even when one assumes no correlation
between intermediate and aggregate productivities.
There is a rich literature on general equilibrium models with endogenous bankrupt-
cies. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) build on the Bernanke and Gertler (1989) model
whereby lending agency costs arise endogenously and introduce a class of capital
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transforming entrepreneurs that rely on their net-worth as collateral to raise exter-
nal debt financing. These entrepreneurs can default on their debt obligations after
a large enough negative shock affects their ability to transform capital. The possi-
bility of defaults interacts with the dynamics of the entrepreneurs’ net-worth over
the business cycle to replicate the empirically observed positive autocorrelation of
output at short horizons. In this paper, I ignore the net-worth effects on the ability
of borrowers to secure external financing. Instead, I link default probabilities to the
aggregate TFP driving the business cycle–Mostly through the variation of the inter-
mediate good price. This generates countercyclical costs of financing that increase
output when aggregate TFP is improving and worsen it when TFP is lower. As
noted in Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2003) the costly financing general equilibrium
model in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) fails to reproduce the empirically observed
countercyclical default premiums.
The bankruptcy mechanism used in this paper is similar to the one in Pesaran
and Xu (2016). A major difference resides in the way the two papers deal with
employment. While Pesaran and Xu (2016) choose a specific consumer utility func-
tion to disentangle the problem of default from that of labour, I choose to dissociate
defaults from labour demand by assuming that some firms borrow to produce an
intermediate good (intermediate production firms) and others hire labour, rent cap-
ital and use the intermediate good to produce the final good (final good production
firms). Another major difference lies is in the modelling of the banking sector, a
mere multiplier in Pesaran and Xu (2016), the model presented here assumes that
banks set interest rates through balance sheet optimization. Banks provide the in-
termediate good producing firms with loans that carry an interest rate that reflect
the probability of defaults expected by the bank at the time of the loan issuance.
Finally, the productivity of intermediate producers is assumed to be correlated with
an aggregate total productivity factor driving the productivity of the firm producing
the final good. Unlike in Pesaran and Xu (2016) where default probabilities do not
fluctuate with the cycle, the combination of the way banks ”price” the credit risk
of loans and the fact that the revenues of the intermediate good producing firms
fluctuate with the cycle imply that default rates and credit spreads fluctuate with
the cycle in a countercyclical fashion, thus accelerating growth during highs of the
business cycle as well as through recession periods.
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) develop a New Keynesian DSGE model
with a mechanism for endogenous defaults. This is achieved through the assumption
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that a class of entrepreneurs transforms capital by investing their net worth as a
source of self-financing and securing the rest of the required financing through bank
loans. Similarly, to what I assume in this paper, the authors assume that the effi-
ciency of the entrepreneur’s ability to transform capital is subject to idiosyncratic
shocks. A sufficiently unfavourable shock can lead to the borrower’s bankruptcy. In
addition, the authors assume that the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks that hit
the entrepreneur’s return is the realisation of a time-varying process. As this variance
changes through time, the cross-sectional distribution of returns also changes, thus
producing time variation in credit risk and thereby time-varying credit spreads. In
the model I consider in this paper, the variations in default rates and credit spreads
are generated by procyclical behaviour of the borrowing firms’ revenues. This guar-
antees a countercyclical behaviour of bankruptcy rates and credit spreads without
having to assume the existence of an additional exogenous process driving credit risk.
Falato and Xiao (2020) argue that learning from noisy information is an important
propagation mechanism for understanding credit and business cycles. They build a
general equilibrium model with information asymmetries between lenders and bor-
rowers whereby lenders interpret deteriorations in short-term profit outlook as bad
news about firms’ default risks. In turn, firms perceive debt as underpriced and
cut investments. The authors develop a model of credit-market investors’ learning
that generates countercyclical default rates and credit spreads and can quantita-
tively account for the long-lasting widening in spreads and contraction in aggregate
investment during the 2007-09 financial crisis. The model I develop in this paper
requires no asymmetries in the information available to the lender and borrower at
the time the loan is contracted. Countercyclical default rates and credit spreads are
generated by the combination of cyclical sale prices of the intermediate good and
the fact that intermediate productivity is positively correlated with aggregate TFP.
This guarantees that revenues are cyclical which is sufficient to make default rates
move inversely with the cycle. Because credit spreads reflect the cost due to future
defaults, they too display a countercyclical behaviour.
In the general equilibrium model presented in section 2, I also assume that in-
termediate producers face an adjustment cost when varying their production levels.
This and the correlation of intermediate production productivity with aggregate to-
tal factor productivity (TFP) help generate realistic dynamics of defaults and credit
spreads while keeping the variance of output in line with the historical experience of
the U.S. economy. The steady state, calibration method and dynamic findings are
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presented in section 3.
2 General Equilibrium
In this section, I study a general equilibrium model with an intermediate good pro-
ducing sector that provides a final representative firm with input. Intermediate
production is financed through debt financing provided by a competitive banking
sector with no entry costs that uses households’ deposit to fund its lending opera-
tions. Some of the borrowing firms can default on their debt obligations when their
revenues are too low to cover debt payments. In order to achieve no profit and no
loss in expectation, the competitive banks reflect the default losses they expect in
the interest rates they charge the borrowing firms. Final production firms use capital
and labour to produce a final good that is consumed by households, transformed into
new capital or used as an input to the intermediate production process. Households
set their consumption, labour supply, capital investments and deposits to maximise
expected utility, discounted over their lifetime.
2.1 Intermediate good producing firms
I assume the existence of a sector with firms that transform output before its use
as an intermediate good by final production firms. The intermediate production
process is fully financed by banks through loan issuance. It takes an intermediate
good producing firm a single time period to produce a quantity yMt+1, to do so it
issues a single time period maturity loan to the banks of principal Xt and uses the









where the index i denotes the firm, Zi,t+1 is a heterogeneous and stochastic efficiency
factor, λ is a parameter reflecting the cost of changing the level of production and
f(.) represents the deterministic component of the intermediate production tech-
nology before incurring adjustment costs. Furthermore, I assume that intermediate
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production efficiencies follow a log-normal processes




1 − (ρM)2εi]. (2.2)
zat is a common efficiency factor, representing aggregate productivity, that is time-
dependent and that follows an AR(1) process: zat = ρaz
a
t−1 + et where et are normal
and i.i.d. shocks. The terms εi reflect the idiosyncratic firm efficiency and are
normally distributed, independent across firms and independent from the common
efficiency factor zt. The parameter σM is a volatility parameter representing the
riskiness of the intermediate production projects and ρM reflects the interdependence
of intermediate production across different firms. The type of the firm εi is not
known before the loan maturity so that all intermediate production firms are a priori
identical and they all face the same cost of financing Rt and raise the same loan
principal Xt. They also produce the same intermediate good, sold at the unique
price Qt.
In the case where the intermediate production firms do not default, their profit is
πMi,t+1 = Qt+1Zi,t+1g(Xt, Xt−1) −RtXt,
where by definition g(Xt, Xt−1) := f(Xt)
(




. The intermediate good
producing firms walk away on their debt if their non-default profit is negative. In the
case where a firm defaults, the lending bank takes over intermediate good production
and loses a fraction θ of the produced intermediate goods in the process, reflecting
a cost for the bank to go through bankruptcy workouts and the fact that the firms’
managers possess more knowledge about the production process than banks. In the
spirit of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), an intermediate production firm chooses to




words, defaults happen when standardised version of the Gaussian variable zi,t+1 is
below a certain value, denoted −ξt+1.1 The default probability of the intermediate
production firms is given by
DPt+1 = Φ(−ξt+1), (2.3)
where Φ denotes the normal cumulative distribution function. Following the nomen-
1The standardised version of Gaussian variable X ∼ N(µ, σ2) is X−µσ .
7
clature inspired by Merton (1974), ξt+1 is called the ”distance to default”. In the
current set-up, the distance to default depends on the common factor zat+1, the cur-
















Note here that DPt+1 is meant to be the default probability at the maturity of the
loan but before the firm realizes its own type εi. Once the type εi is known to the
borrowing firm, default or survival are immediately determined and are not random
any more. The used correlation structure and the assumption that 0 < ρM < 1
guarantee a positive correlation of efficiencies across firms. During recessions, the
common factor zat+1 is low and all firms have lower efficiencies, while in intermediate
producers’ efficiency is high when zat+1 is high. This in turn means that when the
aggregate efficiency factor is low, default rates are higher in the economy. Inversely,
default rates are low when aggregate productivity is high. In addition to the direct
effect of aggregate efficiency, there are indirect effects that operate through the other
variables affecting the distance to default. These variables are the price of the inter-
mediate good Qt+1, the size of the loan Xt and the charged interest rate Rt. While
it is clear that, everything else being equal, default rates increase with higher loan
levels Xt and higher interest rates Rt and decrease with higher sale prices Qt+1, the
net combined effect of these variables will be assessed through simulation in section
3. Section 3 will also show the effect of the cost of adjusting investment as reflected
by the parameter λ. The fact that changing the level of intermediate production is
costly has two important implications. First, it dampens the changes in the levels
of intermediate good productions. Second, the costly adjustment in intermediate
production levels provides a motivation for intermediate producers to maintain rel-
atively high levels of loan demand when productivity is low. This, in turn, means
that the loan market clears at a higher interest rate Rt, thus implying a higher credit
spreads during recession periods. This and the fact that the presence of investment
adjustment costs does not impact the steady state of the model implies that the
parameter λ is key to generating realistic credit spreads dynamics.
The intermediate goods’ producing firms maximise profit, taking defaults into
8








where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set avail-
able at time t and πM,di,t+1 is the profit taking into account the possibility of future
default
πM,di,t+1 = Qt+1Zi,t+1g(Xt, Xt−1)1εi>−ξt+1 −RtXt1εi>−ξt+1 . (2.6)
Given the independence between the idiosyncratic shocks εi and the aggregate pro-
ductivity common factor zat+1, one can rewrite expected profits as follows










where ΣM := σM
√
1 − ρ2M is the volatility of the idiosyncratic part of the interme-
diate production efficiency. One can therefore write the loan demand equation in a

































The latter formulation of the loan demand equation confirms the fact that all firms
face the same gross interest rate Rt and raise the same level of loan Xt. Writing
∂g(Xt,Xt−1)
∂Xt
in the form below clarifies the role of the parameter λ in moderating the








(Xt −Xt−1) f(Xt). (2.9)
The parameter λ shifts loan demand lower when it is increasing in comparison to the




Production of the final good is performed by a representative firm that is constrained
by a Cobb-Douglass technology that uses labour (Ht), capital (Kt) and the inter-










M ζt , (2.10)
where ζ is the share of the intermediate good and (1 − ζ)α is the share of capital.
The production sector productivity Zat is completely driven by the systemic factor
defined in the previous section ln(Zat ) = σaz
a
t . The demand for capital, labour and
the intermediate input are set to maximize the final producer’s profit
max
Ht,Kt,Mt
Yt − rKt Kt − wtHt −QtMt, (2.11)
where wt is the wage and r
K
t is the rental cost of labour. The first order condition
for investments in capital, labour and the intermediate good are























In addition, households are assumed to accumulate capital Kt and invest in deposits
Dt. They decide consumption Ct, labour supply Lt, deposits Dt and new capital Kt








where 0 < β < 1 denotes the preferences discount factor. The household optimisation
is subject to the budget constraint
Ct +Dt +Kt = wtLt +R
D
t−1Dt−1 + (1 − δ + rKt )Kt−1 + Πt (2.17)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, rKt is the rental rate of capital, R
D
t is
the gross deposit rate and Πt is the profit distributed to households. Πt is the
combination of the profit distributed by the banks ΠBt and the profit distributed by
the intermediate good producing firms ΠMt (the final good producing firms makes no






Finally, one can derive the Euler equations for deposits and capital and the labour













Banks hold a balance sheet composed of loans issued to finance the operations of the
intermediate production firms and finance these loans using households’ deposits.
The representative bank invests in a large enough portfolio of loans such as the
final fraction defaulting is Φ(−ξt+1), where t+ 1 is the loans’ maturity and ξt+1 the
distance to default.2 The bank recovers a fraction 1 − θ of the production proceeds
after the borrower’s default. In the case of the model I study, one can calculate the
final recovery and its expectations as follows








Φ(ξt+1)RtXt +Rect+1 −RDt Xt
)
. (2.23)
2This is a direct consequence of the law of large numbers.
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The profit function includes the return from the non-defaulting loans Φ(ξt+1)RtXt,
the recovery from the defaulting loans Rect+1 and the cost of borrowing from house-
holds RDt Xt. Banks are assumed to be competitive and face no entry cost so that
the representative bank runs no profit and no loss in expectation. The zero expected









Clearly, the charged interest rate Rt increases with the default probability Φ(−ξt+1),
with the fractions of production lost conditional on default θ and with the deposit
rates RDt . It is useful to note that in the absence of defaults the bank would simply
charge the deposit rate when issuing loans to the intermediate production firms
(Rt = R
D
t ). The difference between the gross loan rate Rt and the deposit rate R
D
t
reflects the extra spread banks charge the borrowing firms in order to compensate
for losses due to future defaults. I therefore define credit spreads as an annualised







where dt is the time length separating two consecutive time periods (dt = 0.25 in the
case of a quarterly frequency). The idea that banks charge the borrowing firms the
expected cost of future defaults is made clearer by replacing for the loan rate in the
expression of intermediate production firms’ profit 2.6 using condition 2.24 to derive
the expression below the expected profits of the borrowing firm
EtπM,di,t+1 = EtQt+1Zi,t+1g(Xt, Xt−1) −RDt Xt − θEtQt+1Zi,t+1g(Xt, Xt−1)1εi<ξt+1 .
(2.26)
This shows that when there is no loss of intermediate production because of defaults
θ = 0, the expected profits of the intermediate producers are not influenced by credit
spreads or the probabilities of future defaults. The loan demand function remains
impacted by credit spreads as the borrowing firms are price takers and the banks’
pricing equation 2.24 is external to their profit maximisation problem. However, we
will show in section 3 that, for the calibrated model parameters, credit spreads have
little impact on credit markets when θ = 0.
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2.5 Aggregation and Market Clearing
In this subsection, I clarify the market clearing conditions. These are
i The clearing of the final goods market.
Yt = Ct +Xt +Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1. (2.27)
ii The clearing of the labour market.
Ht = Lt. (2.28)
iii The clearing of the bank loan market where supply of loans by banks meets the
demand of the intermediate production firms.
iv The clearing of the intermediate good market, taking into account the effect of
bankruptcies in reducing intermediate production
Mt = Eεi [y
M
i,t ] − θEεi [yMi,t1εi<−ξt ]. (2.29)
v The clearing of the deposits market
Dt = Xt. (2.30)
The remaining of this paper is dedicated to the calibration and simulation of
the model presented in this section. The calibration and simulation procedures are
presented in section 3. This section also presents and comments on the dynamic
effects of each of the model’s main assumptions.
3 Findings
3.1 Steady State equilibrium and calibration
The steady state of the model exists and is unique for the set of model parameters
chosen in our calibration3. The steady state default rate is Φ(−ξ̄) with a steady state
3See appendix B for more on the steady state determination.
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The quantity ΣM := σM
√
1 − ρ2M is crucial to default rates in the steady state.
Given the remaining parameters of the model, the volatility ΣM is calibrated to
match the historical U.S. corporate default rate at 3.44%. The dislike for work
parameter χ is chosen to match a steady-state labour at L̄ = 0.3. The loss in
production following default θ is chosen to match the historical U.S. recovery rates
at 40%. The preferences discounting parameter β is chosen so that the model’s
steady-state deposit rate matches the average historical deposit rates in the U.S.
following Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010). The parameter describing the
share of intermediate goods in the production function is set to ζ = 0.5 following
Basu (1995) and Jones (2011).
The cost of readjusting intermediate production λ and the correlation parameter
ρM are key to the reaction of output, default rates and credit spreads following shocks.
These two parameters are jointly calibrated to match the volatility of output and
the volatility of credit spreads in U.S. data. The remaining model parameters are
standard. They are either chosen to match U.S. data or borrowed from the literature.
Table 1 provides a summary of the model parameters and how they are chosen and
table 2 provides the values of key variables of the model in the steady state.
3.2 Dynamic effects
In this subsection, I show the dynamic effects of the main features of the model
through the study of the impulse response functions following negative shocks to the
aggregate total factor productivity Zat . I start by showing the effect of defaults in
accelerating the business cycle before studying the effects of costly adjustment of
intermediate production and the impact of the correlation between the efficiency of
intermediate production and aggregate TFP. The displayed simulations are realised,
for quarterly time periods, in Dynare, using third-order approximations.
3.2.1 The effect of default rates and credit spreads
Figure 1 shows the impulse response function (IRF) of the main variables of the model




σH risk aversion 1 Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)
η curvature on labour 1 Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)
β discount factor 0.996 Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)
χ disutility of labour 9.55 steady state labour at 0.3
Technology
α 0.36 Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)
ζ 0.5 Basu (1995) and Jones (2011)
ρa 0.79 U.S. data
σa 1.1% U.S. data
δ depreciation rate of capital 2.5% Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)
Intermediate production
ΣM idiosyncratic volatility 2.18% Steady state annual default rate 3.44%
θ loss of production upon default 60.1% Steady state loss upon default 60%
ρM correlation with systemic factor 7.4% ρM and λ are set to match volatility of log spreads
λ cost of varying investments 10.1% at 30% and the volatility of log output at 1.5%
Table 1: Assumed and calibrated model parameters.
Variable Steady state value





Intermediary good M̄ 0.106
Deposit rate R̄D − 1 0.40%
Default Rate D̄P 0.87%
Distance to default ξ̄ 2.38
Credit Spread C̄S 2.13%
Price of intermediate good Q̄ 1.12
Table 2: Steady state variables.
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The IRFs are shown for: (i) the main model as calibrated in section 3.1 (ii) a version
of the model assuming no loss in intermediate production upon default (θ = 0, dashed
lines) and (iii) a simple RBC model with no intermediate good production (ζ = 0,
dotted line). It is important to note that the model with no production losses due to
defaults assumes the same cost of adjusting intermediate production λ and the same
correlation among intermediate producers ρM as the main model while the remaining
parameters are recalibrated as in section 3.1 except for the parameter θ that is set
to zero. This guarantees that all the model parameters, with the exception of θ, are
the same as in the main model. The assumption θ = 0 implies no immediate loss in
intermediate production because of defaults. In addition, figure 1 shows that despite
an increase in default probabilities following a negative TFP shock this implies little
fluctuation in credit spreads. In fact, steady-state results show that when θ = 0,
the steady-state credit spread remains positive but is very close to zero.4 There is
therefore little impact on credit markets and future intermediate production because
of credit spreads when θ = 0. The differences between the reaction of the model
variables under the assumptions of the main calibration and when θ is set to zero
can therefore be associated to the effects of defaults and credit spreads. On the other
hand, the results of the RBC model represent the behaviour of the main model in
absence of intermediate production and credit markets.
The presence of defaults related production losses implies a larger drop in loan
levels, investments, capital, labour and output. When defaults impact credit mar-
kets, default probabilities increase following a negative productivity shock. This is
a consequence of the combined effect of lower efficiency of intermediate production
(ρM > 0) and lower prices of intermediate goods. Both these effects depress the rev-
enues of intermediate good producers causing higher default rates. This impact on
default probabilities has two main consequences. First, higher default rates increase
the proportion of intermediate production lost because of the bankruptcy workouts.
This causes a larger immediate drop in intermediate good production and, as a re-
sult, depresses output, labour, capital investments and consumption further relative
to the case where θ = 0. Second, credit spreads increase as banks adjust the interest
rates they charge intermediate producers to compensate for future defaults and loan
demand is lower as the borrowing firms take into account the higher likelihood of
defaults on their future profits. This depresses the size of loans issued further and in
turn, worsens the impact of lower TFP on future output relative to the model where
4When θ = 0, the recovery is very close to the face value of the loan but remain less than the face value.
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defaults do not impact credit markets.
The RBC model produces the familiar dynamics with an immediate drop in out-
put, investment and hours following a surprise negative shock to productivity. The
models that assume the existence of an intermediate production sector relying on
loan financing display reverse hump-shaped a reaction of intermediate production
and output. This is due to the drop in the size of the loans issued, which lowers
future intermediate production and negatively impact the final production in the
second time period after the shock. The reverse hump-shape reaction of intermedi-
ate production to negative shocks implies a similarly shaped reaction of hours worked
as labour is less productive when there are fewer intermediate goods available in the
economy. In the current set-up, I assume a single-period maturity of the loans. A
version of the current model with longer loan maturities would propagate the effect
of changes in TFP fluctuations for multiple time periods after the shock. Longer
maturity debt instruments would therefore cause more persistence in the response of
output and investments.
Similarly to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), positive autocorrelation of outputs is
generated by assuming the possibility of bankruptcy in parts of the economy’s pro-
ductive sector. However, there is a major difference between the mechanisms of
both models. In Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) investments cuts are delayed following
negative shocks as it takes time for the shock to affect the net-worth of borrowers
thereby affecting their ability to raise external financing. In the model I study, a
systemic increase in default probabilities is triggered by the worsening of aggregate
productivity. Higher future default probabilities are reflected by banks in the credit
spreads. This discourages intermediate production firms from borrowing and re-
duces the level of loans in the economy. Which, in turn, reduces future intermediate
production and future output. The model presented in this paper produces counter-
cyclical credit spreads and default rates in a way that delays part of the reaction of
intermediate production and output. The countercyclical behaviour of credit spreads
is a documented feature of business cycles that is not generated by models of the
type in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998).
As explained in Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2003), in these agency cost models, the
net-worth of the borrowers takes some time to deteriorate after a negative shock.
This dampens the reaction of internal funds and implies a lower reliance on exter-
nal funds as the financing needs drop faster than internal funds. Monitoring costs
decrease as a result, thus reducing default premiums after negative shocks. On the
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other hand, the slow reduction in net-worth also pushes the borrower to delay some
of the investment cuts, generating a reverse hump-shaped reaction of investments
and output. The ability of popular agency cost models to generate a persistent au-
tocorrelation of output and investment is linked to the fact that they display cyclical
default premiums.
3.2.2 Effect of investment adjustment costs
Figure 2 shows the dynamic effect of costly adjustment of intermediate production.
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the model assuming that no
costs are incurred by intermediate producers when changing the level of production
(λ = 0). This ”no-adjustment cost” model assumes otherwise the same correlation
parameter ρM as the main model while the parameters χ, ΣM and θ are recalibrated
as in subsection 3.1.
The presence of investment adjustment costs especially affects the reaction of
default rates, credit spreads and the size of the loan to a deterioration in the aggregate
productivity, with a minor impact on the remaining model variables. When it is
costly for intermediate producers to amend their loan demand, loan principals react
less to aggregate TFP shocks. Following an unpredicted negative shock to TFP, the
size of the loan issued decrease but remain at relatively higher levels when compared
to the response of the model where it is costless to adjust intermediate production.
This relatively high level of debt implies a higher likelihood of defaults in the next
time period. Higher expectations of defaults imply higher credit spreads.
The way the parameter λ impacts credit spreads more than consumption, real
investments and output is the reason it is used to help the model match the historical
volatility of credit spreads as per the calibration process described in section 3.1.
Effect of the covariance of intermediate productivity TFP
Figure 3 shows the impact of the correlation between the productivity of the in-
termediate producers and aggregate productivity (ρM) on the response of the main
variables of the model to a negative aggregate productivity shock. The ”no correla-
tion” model assumes that the correlation parameter is set to zero (ρM = 0%) and
the same intermediate production adjustment cost parameter as for the main model.
The remaining parameters are recalibrated as in section 3.1.
A positive intermediate efficiency correlation parameter ρM > 0 means that the
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efficiency of intermediate production deteriorates following negative shocks to TFP
and implies that fewer intermediate goods are produced. This, in turn, implies a
larger drop of output causing lower investments, consumption and hours. In addition,
a positive correlation parameter ρM > 0 worsens the deterioration of intermediate
producers’ revenues following negative shocks and causes higher default rates.5 This,
in turn, causes higher credit spreads following negative shocks.
The difference in the reaction of credit spreads between the model with ρM > 0
and the model with no correlation between intermediate production efficiency and
TFP reflect the difference in future expectations of default rates. This difference is
less important than the difference in default rates immediately following the shock to
productivity leading to a muted effect of the correlation parameter on credit spreads.
The correlation parameter ρM has less effect on credit spreads than on output, while
the cost of adjusting intermediate production λ affects credit spreads more than
output. This justifies the calibration choice made in subsection 3.1 where the pair
(λ,ρM) is calibrated for the model to simultaneously match the historical volatilities
of output and credit spreads.
The positive correlation assumption (ρM > 0) is useful to replicate historical val-
ues of the second moments of some of the aggregate variables but is not crucial to the
functioning of the model’s main mechanism.6 Even when the efficiency of intermedi-
ate production is independent of aggregate TFP (ρM = 0), default rates and credit
spreads remain countercyclical and accelerate the business cycle by affecting loan
issuance and intermediate production thus causing output, consumption and hours
to drop further. The countercyclical behaviour of default rates (and by extension
that of credit spreads) is chiefly a consequence of the procyclical behaviour of the
price of the intermediate good. This procyclical behaviour is rooted in the fact that
the good produced by the borrowing firms is an input in the final production process
and implies a cyclical behaviour of the revenues of intermediate producers, which
generates countercyclical default rates and credit spreads.
5As predicted by the distance to default formula 2.21.
6Alternatively, one can calibrate for the value of ρM to match the historical volatility of investments or hours.
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions following a negative shock to TFP (−1× standard deviation) of: (i) the
main model, (ii) a version of the model assuming no loss in intermediate production upon default (θ = 0, dashed
lines) and (iii) a simple RBC model with no intermediate good production (ζ = 0, dotted line). All variables
but deposit rates, credit spreads and default probability are in logarithmic form. Credit spreads are annualised,
but other interest rate variables are not. 20
Figure 2: Impulse response functions following a negative shock to TFP (−1× standard deviation) of: (i) the
main model and (ii) a version of the model assuming no cost of changing intermediate production (λ = 0, dashed
lines). All variables but deposit rates, credit spreads and default probability are in logarithmic form. Credit
spreads are annualised, but other interest rate variables are not.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions following a negative shock to TFP (−1× standard deviation) of: (i) the
main model and (ii) a version of the model assuming that the efficiency of intermediate production is independent
of aggregate TFP (ρM = 0, dashed lines). All variables but deposit rates, credit spreads and default probability
are in logarithmic form. Credit spreads are annualised, but other interest rate variables are not.
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4 Concluding remarks
I present a general equilibrium model with endogenous defaults that reproduces the
counter-cyclical fluctuations of default rates and credit spreads. This is achieved by
assuming the existence of a sector of firms that borrow from banks to produce an
intermediate good used by a representative final production firm. The model displays
procyclical behaviour of the intermediate good prices. This depresses the revenues
of intermediate production firms during slumps and increases these revenues when
the economy is performing well, thus generating countercyclical default rates and,
in turn, countercyclical credit spreads. This mechanism is made more potent by
assuming a positive correlation between the efficiency of the intermediate producers
and aggregate TFP. In addition, I assume that the borrowing firms face a quadratic
adjustment cost when adapting their level of production to take productivity shocks
into account. I show that these adjustment costs are key to generating quantitatively
realistic dynamics of credit spreads while the correlation between the productivity of
the borrowing firms and the aggregate productivity is important to the fluctuation of
aggregate output, investment and consumption. These features inform the calibra-
tion process of the model so that the model is able to generate reasonable dynamics
for the aggregate quantities that are well captured by the usual real business cycle
models while generating realistic dynamics of default rates and credit spreads.
The model considered in this paper provides a simple framework for the modelling
of endogenous bankruptcies in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework.
The model can be extended to capture the behaviour of simple economies with long
term debt contracts as well as economies with multiple debt maturities. Such mod-
elling effort would help analyse the effect of the use of long-term debt contract on
the dynamic stability of the general equilibrium describing the economy and in the
modelling of various other term structure effects. This will be the subject of future
research efforts.
Because of the relative simplicity of the used bankruptcy mechanism, it can be
used in the context of larger general equilibrium models. For instance, monetary
DSGE models can be augmented to reproduce countercyclical default rates and credit
spreads and their effects on other aggregates through the introduction of an inter-




The model equations describing the general equilibrium are presented in this appendix.
zat = ρaz
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Dt = Xt, (A.17)
Lt = Ht, (A.18)
Yt = Ct +Xt +Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1. (A.19)
B Steady state
In this appendix, I provide the equations that uniquely determine the steady state of
the model. First, the SS deposit and capital rental rates follow directly from the Euler
equations
R̄D = 1/β, (B.1)
r̄K = 1/β − 1 + δ. (B.2)
I will express the remaining SS variables as a direct or indirect function of the SS loan
level X̄, the SS distance to default ξ̄ and the SS price of the intermediate good Q̄. First
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The final good clearing condition yields SS consumption
C̄ = Ȳ − M̄ − δK̄. (B.6)
Combining the first conditions for labour provision 2.21 and demand 2.13 yields SS labour
L̄1+η =




One can then deduce the SS wages from the labour demand first order condition
w̄ = (1 − ζ)(1 − α) Ȳ
L̄
. (B.8)
The recovery in the SS is
R̄ec = (1 − θ)Q̄Φ(−ξ̄ − ΣM )eΣ
2
M/2f(X̄). (B.9)
The expression of the recovery combined with the bank loan pricing condition leads to an
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The SS distance to default expression 2.4, demand for loans condition 2.8 and technology
constraint 2.10 provide three equations to solve for X̄, Q̄ and ξ̄ using the above to express
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26
References
Basu, S. (1995): “Intermediate Goods and Business Cycles: Implications for Productivity
and Welfare,” American Economic Review, 85(3), 512–31.
Bernanke, B., and M. Gertler (1989): “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations,” The American Economic Review, 79(1), 14–31.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1998): “The Financial Accelerator in
a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework,” Working Paper 6455, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Carlstrom, C. T., and T. S. Fuerst (1997): “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis,” The American Economic
Review, 87(5), 893–910.
Christiano, L., R. Motto, and M. Rostagno (2010): “Financial factors in economic
fluctuations,” Working Papers Series, European Central Bank, 47(1).
Falato, A., and J. Xiao (2020): “Credit Markets, Learning, and the Business Cycle,”
Discussion paper.
Gomes, J. F., A. Yaron, and L. Zhang (2003): “Asset prices and business cycles with
costly external finance,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 6(4), 767 – 788, Finance and
the Macroeconomy.
Jones, C. I. (2011): “Intermediate Goods and Weak Links in the Theory of Economic
Development,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(2), 1–28.
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (1997): “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy,
105(2), 211–248.
Merton, R. C. (1974): “ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK
STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*,” The Journal of Finance, 29(2), 449–470.
Pesaran, M. H., and T. Xu (2016): “Business Cycle Effects of Credit Shocks in a DSGE
Model with Firm Defaults,” Working Paper.
27
